

**STRATEGY
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**RAPID DECISIVE OPERATIONS (RDO):
A CASE STUDY ANALYSIS**

BY

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

RAPID DECISIVE OPERATIONS (RDO): A CASE STUDY ANALYSIS

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ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Lieutenant Colonel Brian P. Stephenson
TITLE: Rapid Decisive Operations (RDO): A Case Study Analysis
FORMAT: Strategy Research Project
DATE: 09 April 2002 PAGES: 41 CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

Does Rapid Decisive Operations (RDO) represent a revolutionary approach that differs from the way the United States has executed other small scale contingencies in the past? Does it offer value-added worth investment as the new Joint Doctrinal Concept to implement Joint Vision 2020? This document used two small scale contingencies, Operation Just Cause (Panama) and Operation Allied Force (Kosovo), to answer these two questions. Each operation was analyzed using three criteria: geo-strategic factors, friendly and enemy capabilities and limitations, and application of the four elements of national power (diplomatic, informational, military, and economic - DIME). The outcomes of these case studies were evaluated against the outcomes desired by successful RDO. The conclusions are that RDO is a useful concept for experimentation of future joint concepts but not the tool to fully operationalize JV 2020. The strength of RDO lies not in applying the complete concept to only "high-end" small scale contingencies, but to extract many of the RDO sub-component concepts to full spectrum joint operations.

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RAPID DECISIVE OPERATIONS (RDO): A CASE STUDY ANALYSIS

The Department of Defense's 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) outlined three major themes for the future of our armed forces: the ongoing "revolution in military affairs;"¹ a capabilities based approach to developing our force structure to defeat our adversaries; and transformation of the joint force to meet these threats in a dynamic global environment. Achieving a revolution in military affairs requires "not only technological innovation but also development in operational concepts, undertaking organizational adaptations and training and experimentation to transform a country's military forces."² The foundational document to articulate transformation is Joint Vision 2020 (JV 2020).³ The lead agency for conducting joint transformation is the United States Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM). "USJFCOM's primary transformation vehicle is Rapid Decisive Operations (RDO), providing the joint context for major Service and CINC warfighting experiments. RDO is the tool to operationalize JV 2020."⁴

The concept of RDO was modeled from the characteristics exhibited in Operation Just Cause in Panama. This operation used a simultaneous a rapid and decisive parallel attack methodology to decapitate the Noriega regime, rather than a linear lodgment, build-up, attrition approach. For this reason, the future method of joint warfare has been described by some as the "Just Cause Approach" to warfare. However, "any expectation that Just Cause will be the model for future operations may be ill-founded"⁵ because of some of the operational advantages the United States enjoyed for this particular operation. Furthermore, RDO is designed only for use in the "high-end" small scale contingencies, a very narrow niche of the full spectrum of conflict (FIGURE1).

If RDO is the tool to operationalize JV 2020, the stakes are high to ensure it is the right concept. This raises two fundamental questions. First, does RDO represent a revolutionary

approach that differs from the way the United States has executed other small scale contingencies in the past? Second, does it offer value-added worth the investment? This case study will review two small scale contingencies in Panama and Kosovo to answer these questions.




FIGURE 1 RDO SPECTRUM OF CONFLICT⁶

INTRODUCTION OF CASE STUDIES AND EVALUATION CRITERIA

CASE STUDY SELECTION

The following two case studies were selected because they were “high-end” small scale contingency operations designed to defeat an adversary rapidly and decisively. Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia were not selected because they were primarily longer term humanitarian or peacekeeping operations. Operation Urgent Fury (Grenada), the first major joint contingency operation since the Vietnam era, was not selected because of the operational similarities to Just Cause, and the fact that many of problems with that operation were improved as a result of the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act. Operation Just Cause was an audacious and well executed plan in which the successes made it the poster child for RDO. However, the complexity of the operation was eased by the longstanding military presence in Panama, the advantage of in-theater forces prior to the operation, and the relatively close proximity to the Continental United States which eased the ability to project power. Its greatest shortfall was during the transition from combat operations to stability operations and setting the conditions for the Endara Administration. Operation Allied Force (Kosovo) was hailed by some as proof that wars can be won by air power alone and without friendly casualties. Set on a backdrop of multinational political consensus required to preserve NATO, it lacked joint and combined coherency and exposed the cumbersome deployment capabilities of the legacy force. It is debatable as to whether conflict termination was a result of allied airpower or Serbia’s loss of Russian diplomatic support.

ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION CRITERIA

Case Study Analysis Criteria

The following criteria are used to analyze the critical variables of each case study:

- Geo-strategic factors consisting of the geo-political setting, level of national interest, and strategic/theater objectives.
- Capabilities and limitations of friendly and enemy forces to include; force ratios, power projection requirements versus forces available in theater, time available to plan and conduct the operation, and technology.
- The application of the military instrument of power in concert with diplomatic, informational, and economic (DIME) instruments of national power as compared to the RDO components of Knowledge, Command and Control, and Operations.

These criteria will be used to determine the variables underlying each conflict and answer the first question, does RDO represent a revolutionary approach that differs from the way the United States has executed other small scale contingencies in the past?

RDO Concept Evaluation Criteria

Each case study will be evaluated against the outcomes of successful RDO:

- Were strategic/theater objectives achieved?
- Was the adversary coerced, compelled, or defeated?
- Was it done rapidly?⁷
- Was it decisive?⁸
- Did the operation set the conditions for transition to stability operations or major theater war?

An important aspect in evaluating the outcome of each case study is to distinguish the difference between the designs of the campaign based upon strategic and operational joint

<i>What's Different About RDO ?</i>	
<p>Legacy Operations are:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Deconflicted• Sequential<ul style="list-style-type: none">Deploy, Lodge, Build-up.....• Progressive<ul style="list-style-type: none">Plan before moving.....• Linear<ul style="list-style-type: none">LOCs, FSCLs, FLOTS.....• Attrition-based<ul style="list-style-type: none">Achieve numerical superiorityAttack the enemy's forcesDominate terrain• Symmetrical<ul style="list-style-type: none">Match capability with capabilityMutually supporting elements• Terrain oriented<ul style="list-style-type: none">Seize and hold terrain• Force-oriented<ul style="list-style-type: none">Defeat the enemy's forces• Enabled by IPB and situational development	<p>Tomorrow's RDO should be:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Integrated• Simultaneous<ul style="list-style-type: none">Understand, Access, Strike, Sustain• Parallel<ul style="list-style-type: none">Overlap in planning, moving, & execution• Distributed<ul style="list-style-type: none">Non-contiguous, strike key links & nodes• Effects-based<ul style="list-style-type: none">Achieve qualitative superiorityAttack the enemy's capabilitiesDominate the will• Asymmetrical<ul style="list-style-type: none">Attack vulnerability with capabilityNetworked supported elements• Time definite orientation<ul style="list-style-type: none">Control terrain when necessary• Coherency-oriented<ul style="list-style-type: none">Incapacitate enemy's capabilities• Enabled by dynamic battlespace understanding and exploitation

FIGURE 2 COMPARISON OF LEGACY OPERATIONS AND RDO⁹

doctrinal concepts similar to RDO, or a legacy approach assisted by technological advantages, time, and overwhelming force. An evaluation of these criteria will answer the second question, does RDO provide any value-added? (FIGURE 2)

THEORETICAL FOUNDATION AND THE RDO CONCEPT

THEORETICAL FOUNDATION

The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 brutally demonstrated the reality of asymmetric and transnational threats that were first discussed in the 1997 QDR. These new

threat capabilities have exposed the limitations of our legacy force against a broad spectrum of threats, particularly the potential use of Weapons of Mass Effects (WME) or other anti-access capabilities against lodgments needed by the legacy force to project power and build-up forces prior to decisive operations. Furthermore, the reduced force structure across the Department of Defense at home and overseas has resulted in a need for a lighter, more lethal, and responsive force, the object of service transformation initiatives. The perceived problem with deploying Task Force Hawk Army attack aviation forces to Albania in 1999 provides an illustration of the shortfalls of the legacy force. This prompted 1999 and 2000 Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) to direct USJFCOM to develop "new joint warfighting concepts and capabilities that will improve the ability of the future joint force commanders (JFC) to rapidly and decisively conduct particularly challenging and important operational missions".¹⁰ DPG 2003-2007 gave further guidance to USJFCOM to "develop new operational concepts that focus in particular on the transformation goals" and "exploit US asymmetric military advantages and exploit joint force synergies."¹¹

In recognition of new technology and the necessity to execute a myriad of missions with a smaller force structure against threat capabilities rather than known adversaries, future joint operations will differ from those of the past. They will be based upon four characteristics: knowledge centric, effects-based, coherently joint, and fully networked.¹² These characteristics provide the framework within which the RDO concept is being developed. Hence, the strategic requirement is "to be ready to transition from a relatively peaceful environment to intense combat operations rapidly and decisively to achieve the strategic objectives."¹³

RDO CONCEPT

"Rapid Decisive Operations is a concept for future joint operations. A rapid decisive operation will integrate knowledge, command and control, and operations to achieve the desired political/military effect. In preparing for and conducting a rapid decisive operation, the military acts in concert with and leverages the other instruments of national power to understand and reduce the adversary's critical capabilities and coherence. The United States and its allies asymmetrically assault the adversary from directions and in dimensions against which he has no counter, dictating the terms and tempo of the operation. The adversary, suffering from the loss of coherence and unable to achieve his objectives, chooses to cease actions that are against US interests or has his capabilities defeated".¹⁴

RDO is not designed to resolve longstanding problems, long-term commitments, or major theater wars, but rather in "high-end" small scale contingencies. Its outcome is to, "rapidly and decisively coerce, compel, or defeat the enemy to accomplish our strategic objectives without a

lengthy campaign or an extensive buildup of forces," and set the conditions for a transition to either post conflict operations or extended combat operations.¹⁵ USJFCOM's capstone document, RDO Whitepaper Version 2.0 entitled "A Concept for Rapid Decisive Operations", provides a comprehensive explanation of the key concepts and capabilities needed to achieve RDO. The three major components are Knowledge, Command and Control, and Operations.¹⁶ The interrelationships between these RDO concepts and characteristics are summarized by the following hypothesis:¹⁷

- If a Standing Joint Command and Control Element
- Is informed by Operational Net Assessment
- And employs Effects-Based Operations
- Then the result is Rapid Decisive Operations

To meet the tasking in the DPG 2003-2007, USJFCOM has developed a joint experimentation campaign plan to develop the RDO concept.¹⁸

OPERATION JUST CAUSE (PANAMA)

STRATEGIC SETTING AND THEATER CONCEPT OF THE OPERATION

The death of Torrijos in 1981 marked the rise of power of General Manual Noriega and a renewed of tension between Panama and the US. Noriega began consolidating his power as the commander of the National Guard which he restructured and renamed the Panamanian Defense Force (PDF). Though an apparent ally for US foreign policy initiatives to combat communism in Central America, Noriega's involvement in drug trafficking and his consolidation of political power by use of military force led to a deterioration of national relations. In February 1988, Noriega was indicted by the US on drug trafficking charges. In March 1988, the U.S. froze all Panamanian assets in US banks, withheld canal payments, and suspended trade on goods from Panama. This resulted in a 25% reduction in the Panamanian economy.¹⁹ Noriega reacted by turning to Cuba, Nicaragua, and Libya for economic and military assistance, which in turn began sending small arms for the establishment of a civil defense force called "Dignity Battalions".²⁰ In April 1988, President Reagan invoked the International Emergency Powers Act, declaring a national emergency with Panama. This began the attempt to remove Noriega from power by non-military means, all of which failed, an increase of military training exercises, and increased security in the Canal Zone. In January 1989, the Panamanian Government signed an agreement with the Soviet Union to establish a Soviet Mission in Panama. On 15 December 89, Noriega declared a state of war with America. President Bush issued the

execution order of Operation Just Cause on 17 December a day after the killing of a US Marine Lieutenant and the assault of a Navy Lieutenant and his wife by the PDF.

Although there were already Operations Plans (OPLANS) for the defense of Panama Canal, contingency planning for the intervention that would ultimately become Just Cause began under USSOUTHCOM commander, GEN Woerner in 1988. Named ELABORATE MAZE, and later four separate plans called PRAYER BOOK, GEN Woerner proposed a gradual force build-up with increased economic and diplomatic pressure, using his Army Component Command, US Army South (USARSO) as the Joint Force HQs. In October 1989, with the appointment of GEN Powell as the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), GEN Thurman as the new CINC USSOUTHCOM, and a failed coup attempt against Noriega, contingency planning was reviewed and updated resulting in USSOUTHCOM OPLAN 1-90 called BLUE SPOON. This called for an increased force structure, rapid reaction time, and a forcible entry capability to react to several possible contingencies ranging from potential support of another coup, to full intervention. GEN Thurman designated LTG Stiner, Commander XVIII Airborne Corps, as Commander Joint Task Force-South (JTF-South). By 3 November, JTF-South completed OPLAN 90-2, which began six weeks of component planning and rehearsals by component commands.

OPLAN 90-2 prescribed a rapid deployment plan of 14,000 troops to augment the 13,000 already in theater in order to near-simultaneously attack 27 different targets. These targets were designed to prevent Noriega from fleeing the country and seizing him, neutralized the PDF command and control and forces, and protect American citizens and critical infrastructure of the Canal Zone. Half of the deploying forces (7,000) would arrive on D-Day by air drop or airland. The remaining 7,000 from the 7th Infantry Division and support units deployed between D-Day to D+2. Supported by air force and assets, which included 80 C-141, 25 C-130, and 11 C-5 lift aircraft to execute the forcible entry operation, the JTF was comprised primarily of Army units organized into five major task forces. The Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) was comprised of Rangers, Special Forces, Navy Seals, and Special Operations Aviation. Their primary missions were to seize key terrain and neutralize forces at Tocumen-Torrijos International Airport and Rio Hato Airfield, deny the ability for Noriega to flee the country by land, sea, or air, and capture Noriega. Task Force Bayonet, comprised of the 193d Infantry Brigade, already in theater, was to neutralize the PDF command and control by seizing La Commandancia and other PDF facilities in Panama City. Task Force Pacific was a Brigade from the 82d Airborne Division arriving by air drop on D-Day, with the mission to attack PDF units in the vicinity of Panama City. Task Force Atlantic, a Brigade from the 7th Infantry Division,

was to attack PDF units in the vicinity of Colon on the Atlantic side and secure critical infrastructure of the Panama Canal. Task Force Semper Fidelis, already in theater, was designated to seize critical bridges, highways, and US installations. From D-Day to D+2, two more Brigades from the 7th Infantry Division were to air-land and reinforce Task Forces Pacific and Atlantic with one brigade each. An additional 2,000 support troops, primarily military police and civil affairs units, used for the sequel Operation Promote Liberty, were to arrive following at D+2.

CASE STUDY ANALYSIS

Geo-strategic Factors

The geo-strategic factors surrounding Operation Just Cause stand in stark contrast to the Operation Urgent Fury, which projected 100% of its combat power after just two weeks of strategic and three days of operational planning. First, the longstanding vital national interests amplified by military presence in the Panama Canal Zone.²¹ Second, the in-theater military presence and build-up of forces prior to the operation. Third, the deliberate planning and rehearsal time for the mission. Just Cause was a unilateral military mission with no backing from the United Nation or the Organization of the American States (OAS). However, the Bush Administration did justify the operation based upon the right to self defense in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, Article 21 of the Organization of American States Charter, and Article IV of the Panama Canal Treaty.²² Finally, President Endara, recognized by the US as the duly elected President of Panama, was sworn into office at Fort Clayton, Panama, before midnight on 19 December. He personally approved of the operation.²³

Panama was a vital national interest because of strategic and economic implications of Panama Canal. This was further amplified by the presence of over 30,000 American citizens, service members, and their families. It was also a vital interest because of the national policy to maintain regional stability by ensuring democratic governments and renewed interest in countering the drug market. These interests were re-emphasized in President Bush's address to the Nation on 20 December. As with Grenada, the threat to the safety of American citizens became the trigger for the invasion.

The five strategic-political objectives set by President Bush were to.²⁴

- Safeguard the lives of nearly 30,000 US citizens residing in Panama.
- Protect the integrity of the Panama Canal and 142 US defense sites.
- Help the Panamanian opposition establish a genuine democracy.

- Neutralize the PDF.
- Bring Noriega to justice.

The six theater military objectives were to.²⁵

- Protect US lives and key sites and facilities.
- Capture and deliver Noriega to a competent authority.
- Neutralize Panamanian Defense Forces.
- Neutralize Panamanian Defense Force command and control.
- Support the establishment of a US recognized government in Panama.
- Restructure the Panamanian Defense Force.

Capabilities and Limitations

The Panama Defense Force numbered 12,800 troops, of which 4,000 were considered combat troops. They were organized into two battalions and 5 infantry companies, a cavalry troop, two public order companies, and 28 armored cars.²⁶ Their equipment was primarily US purchased, however, since 1989, there were an undisclosed amount of Soviet weapons caches which Noriega had purchased for arming civilians, primarily his "Dignity Battalions. US peak strength consisted of 18 Infantry Battalions, 12 combat and combat support companies, a brigade of attack and assault aviation, and three battalion sized special operations forces units. US forces were well trained and equipped for night operations.

As previously mentioned, approximately half of the 27,000 U.S forces were pre-positioned in theater for combat operations, one forth were introduced at H-Hour, D-Day by airborne/airland assault, and one fourth follow-on forces which closed in theater by D+2. U.S. forces had planned and rehearsed the operation for six weeks. With an increased alert posture and increase in hostile acts since 15 December, the PDF became aware of the exact time of H-Hour seven hours prior, enough time to alert their units to draw weapons and defend their locations.²⁷ Although US forces lost tactical surprise, they maintained the advantage of strategic surprise since the PDF could not effectively counter the operation.

Application of Power

KNOWLEDGE

Longstanding national interests and diplomatic ties, permanent basing for operational headquarters and tactical forces, and a protracted crisis for over two years facilitated superior knowledge of friendly and enemy capabilities at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. This stands in stark contrast to the complete lack of information described as "policy without

intelligence" experienced in planning Operation Urgent Fury.²⁸ Operation Just Cause was a rare opportunity to exploit these advantages when the government of Panama turned into an adversary. At the strategic level, the President, Secretary of Defense, and Joint Staff were privy to the details of 22 months of deliberate campaign planning. At the operational level, senior military leaders personally knew each other. By being permanently based inside Panama, commanders had the unique opportunity to know firsthand the terrain they would fight on, and have pre-existing command and control structures in place. They also knew the capabilities of the PDF, because they had helped train and equip them. At the tactical level, in-theater forces were provided the opportunity to conduct reconnaissance and rehearsals on the terrain which they would fight. Forces from the Continental United States were afforded the time to complete and rehearse their component plans.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

Many of the advantages that led to superior knowledge led to effective command and control. Although the operation was complex, it was unilateral and primarily an Army operation, which simplified the interoperability of forces. Within the Department of Defense, the command structure was clearly defined. As outlined in the Goldwater-Nichols Act, the chain of command flowed directly from the President to the Secretary of Defense to GEN Thurman, to LTG Stiner. In fact, in October 1989, GEN Thurman clearly charged LTG Stiner with full responsibility for planning and execution of the operation.²⁹ Likewise, LTG Stiner, developed the same firm command relationships with his component commanders. Furthermore, with both the USSOUTHCOM and the JTF-South Headquarters already deployed in Panama, there was continuity in command, control and communications.

The biggest disconnect, which effected the transition from combat to stability operations, was the lack of involvement of the State Department. After mid-May 1989, although the US Embassy remained open, it sent its Ambassador and most of its staff back to the United States. During the final stages of planning for Just Cause, there was no US Ambassador coordination with GEN Thurman.³⁰ On 6 January 1990 during Operation Just Cause, Ambassador Deanne Hinton arrived in Panama for the first time only one week after accepting his duties. His immediate assessment was that the US Army was "busy implementing a military government", and that there seemed to be a "major mistake made in the planning" with no thought to civilian input to reestablishing the Endara government and restoring post-conflict stability.³¹ One of his first tasks was to scale back plans for more military civil affairs units and to develop his own aid program "virtually from scratch."³²

OPERATIONS

The RDO component of operations posits that the military instrument of national power works best when integrated with diplomatic, informational, and economic national capabilities. This was not the case in Operation Just Cause. The other instruments of power designed to prevent armed conflict did little to support Just Cause after the policy decision to conduct a full scale invasion. The military instrument of power was clearly the dominant capability during the campaign after other means failed.³³ This gave the military advantage of operating freely apart from the constraints of these instruments, in accordance with a pre-approved plan, with remarkably few minor changes. With that said, the near simultaneous attack of 27 targets defeated the coherence of the enemy in less than 24 hours. Precision engagement, difficult against personnel targets in urban terrain or dense vegetation, other than the AC-130, was really achieved at the operational level by the timing and accuracy of unit fire and maneuver against each target. Perhaps the biggest miscalculation was refocusing on a new threat that resulted from successfully destroying the coherence of the PDF. The capitulation of the PDF resulted in a rise in activity by the Dignity Battalions, looters, and armed civilians. After the first 24 hours this posed a greater threat than the PDF, but was not effectively targeted. Information operations, rudimentary in 1989, were relegated to tactical psychological warfare units.

The operational and tactical advantages provided by the geo-strategic factors essentially served as enablers to perform this type of operation. The pre-positioning of units, heavy equipment, and supplies facilitated the rapid force deployment and logistical operations and ensured access into several lodgments in theater. This allowed forcible entry forces to remain enemy oriented, facilitating the defeat of the enemy's coherence.

CASE STUDY EVALUATION

Operation Just Cause successfully achieved all five strategic-political and six theater objectives. All but one political objective, the capture of Noriega, was completed by 24 December, and that was achieved when he surrendered on 3 January 1990. The operation was done both rapidly and decisively from 20 December 89 to 11 January 90, with the remainder of troop redeployments completed on 31 January. The PDF was effectively defeated within 24 hours and civil unrest was controlled within five days. The remainder of the operation consisted primarily of stability operations to assist in the installation of the new government.³⁴ Although the operation did set the conditions for transition to stability operations, the lack of integration of diplomatic, economic, and informational instruments of power in conjunction with the use of military power after the capitulation of the PDF inhibited the transition to peace operations.

Even though Operation Promote Liberty, scheduled to arrive on D+2, was activated early and did show some operational flexibility to react to rapid success, it required special operations and combat forces to conduct stability operations without proper resources and training.

OBSERVATIONS

Just Cause demonstrated a coup de main which effectively attacked the coherence of the enemy. This was enabled by unique geo-strategic and operational advantages which are not easily replicated in a distant and remote area of operation. The miscalculation of effects of decapitating PDF, which essentially removed all form of governance, created the conditions for lawlessness and looting which friendly forces not prepared for, and was not adequately anticipated in force structure planning. This was primarily a military operation which left the State Department out of transition planning because of operational security considerations. It could be argued that the success of the operation was simply a result of the Goldwater-Nichols Act reforms, unique operational advantages, and a rare opportunity to be fully rehearsed that enabled success. However, critics cannot ignore boldness and audacity of the plan, especially when compared to the earlier plans requiring lengthy force build-up and promoting the incremental use of military power. If Just Cause is to serve as a blueprint for RDO, the fundamental challenge will be to virtually replicate the operational advantages enjoyed by this operation.

OPERATION ALLIED FORCE (KOSOVO)

STRATEGIC SETTING AND THEATER CONCEPT OF THE OPERATION

The strategic setting of Operation Allied Force differs significantly from Just Cause. First, as a NATO operation, the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR) was responsive to the North Atlantic Council (NAC), and not the President of the United States. Second, the CINC USEUCOM was responsive to the President of the United States and the Secretary of Defense. However, SACEUR and CINCEUR are two hats worn by the same commander, GEN Wesley Clark. This placed GEN Clark in a position where he had to represent differing US and NATO interests. Third, this would be the first time in its 50 year history that NATO would actually conduct combat operations in a struggle for its own credibility in its post-Cold War role as guarantor of collective security in Europe. Finally, this operation was an unprecedented intervention within the sovereignty of Yugoslavia in a civil war between the province of Kosovo and its internationally recognized government in Belgrade.

NATO based its intervention on the 23 September 98 United Nations (UN) Resolution 1199 which authorized "all available means" under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, even though the resolution itself did not specifically authorize the use of force.³⁵ The legality of NATO's decision to use force is subject to debate, but not the subject of this case study.³⁶ Nevertheless, by the fact that NATO assumed the role of the enforcer of the UN Resolution, it placed its credibility on the line in a mission that was "do or die for NATO."³⁷ "From the outset," stated GEN Clark, "I structured a military campaign that met political requirements, that no single target, no set of targets, no bombing series was more important than maintaining the consensus of NATO."³⁸ Maintaining the consensus of the 19 nations within NATO clearly was the principal political objective which would govern all military decisions. It would prove even more difficult after President Clinton made the decision that American ground troops would not be used.

The NATO plan consisted of five phases.³⁹

- Phase 0 - Deployment of air assets into theater.
- Phase 1 - Gain air superiority over Kosovo and attack targets to degrade air defense and command and control in Yugoslavia. A separate stand alone plan for the use of cruise missiles was integrated into this phase.
- Phase 2 - Attack Yugoslavian military targets and ground forces south of the 44th Parallel, which was south of Belgrade and into Kosovo.
- Phase 3 - Expand the bombing to high value targets throughout Yugoslavia.
- Phase 4 - Redeploy forces.

CASE STUDY ANALYSIS

Geo-strategic Factors

The war in Kosovo reflected a continuation of the break-up of the Former Republic of Yugoslavia and the same type of genocide made infamous in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The province of Kosovo held deep historical value to both the Serbians and the ethnic Albanians who live there. Although Kosovo was never sovereign, it did enjoy autonomy from Serbia until 1989 when President Milosevic stripped their multi-ethnic government of its power, replacing it with Serbian officials. This gave rise to the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), an insurgency movement to achieve the sovereignty of Kosovo. By 1998, Serbia was at war with the KLA.

The 5 March 98 massacre of Kosovar civilians in Prekasz sparked international attention to the atrocities in Kosovo, resulting in UN Resolution 1160 condemning the terrorist tactics used by the KLA and the use of force by Serbia. It also raised the ire of US Secretary of State

Madelyn Albright who began a quest to push the human rights issues to the forefront of US national interests. On 15 May 88, Kosovo President Ibrahim Rugova, known for his pacifist views yet interested in Kosovo sovereignty, visited President Clinton. Clinton ruled out unilateral action on the part of the United States and that it should be handled by NATO. On 15 June 98, NATO conducted an ineffective aerial show of force with 85 aircraft over the border of Kosovo. With continued threat of NATO force, on 15 October 98, President Milosevic agreed to withdraw his forces out of Kosovo and the Yugoslavian Chief of General Staff agreed to allow NATO to conduct an Air Verification Mission. The following day, the Chairman of the Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) signed an agreement with the Yugoslavian Minister of Foreign affairs establishing a verification mission in Kosovo to monitor UN Resolution 1160 and 1199.⁴⁰ On 24 October 98, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1203 to support NATO air verification and OSCE verification missions.⁴¹ The situation continued to deteriorate as the KLA continued to provoke the Serbian forces and the Serbs continued to retaliate. The January massacre of 45 Kosavars in Racak caused another strong international reaction, setting up the negotiations between the KLA and Serbia in Rambouillet, France. After Serbia obstinately left the talks and began to mass 40,000 troops on the Kosovo border, the KLA unilaterally signed the Rambouillet Accords. On 20 March 99 the international monitors of the OSCE pulled out of Kosovo and the Serbian Army moved in. On 23 March 99, special envoy Ambassador Holbrooke made one last plea for President Milosevic to peacefully accept the Rambouillet Accord. He didn't accept. NATO began Operation Allied Force on 24 March 99 until President Milosevic capitulated on 10 June 99.

The US and its NATO allies had the three primary interests during the operation:⁴²

- Ensure the stability of Eastern Europe.
- Thwart ethnic cleansing.
- Ensure NATO's credibility.

The three US political objectives were to:⁴³

- Demonstrate the seriousness of NATO's opposition to aggression and its support for peace.
- Deter the Serbs from attacking helpless Kosovar Albanians and to make them pay a price for their actions if they continued to do so.
- Damage Serbia's capacity to wage war against Kosovo by seriously diminishing its military capabilities.

The five NATO Campaign Objectives were:⁴⁴

- To ensure a verifiable stop to all military action and the immediate ending of violence and repression in Kosovo.
- Withdrawal from Kosovo of Serbian military, police, and para-military forces.
- Agreement to the stationing in Kosovo of an international military presence.
- Agreement to the unconditional and safe return of all refugees and displaced persons, and unhindered access to them by humanitarian aid organizations.
- Provide credible assurance of Serbian willingness to work on the basis of the Rambouillet Accords in the establishment of a political framework agreement for Kosovo in conformity with international law and the Charter of the United Nations.

The lack of vital US national interests, loss of political clout by President Clinton because of his Impeachment hearings, and lack of desire by Congress to support another Balkan crisis with ground troops limited the United States' position of power. It also limited NATO options by the announcement that US ground troops would not be involved. The lack of vital interests also limited the risk that the NATO force would be willing to assume when selecting courses of action and executing the campaign. Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen stated, "there was no consensus within NATO to put together a ground campaign," and attempting to do so would have shifted focus away from the consensus that already existed for the air campaign.⁴⁵

Capabilities and Limitations

NATO possessed significant capabilities and advantages over Yugoslavia. Of the 19 member nations, 14 of them contributed up to 1,000 aircraft, 60 % of which were US. The US possessed a significant capability in precision guided munitions which made up 35% of all bombs dropped, brought carrier based naval air and cruise missiles, and introduced the unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV). The NATO basing infrastructure, in close proximity to Yugoslavia, provided 24 bases to bed down aircraft and support the operation. However, NATO was limited in its ability to employ this capability because of the requirement to maintain consensus and the lack of a ground forces. Since the plan relied exclusively on airpower, it was adversely affected by poor weather, a self imposed 15,000 foot drop altitude for force protection,⁴⁶ and no ground troops to identify and guide munitions onto targets. Perhaps the greatest limitation was the veto power each nation had on what it would or would not do, and what could be targeted.

Yugoslavian capabilities included conventional ground forces were equipped with tanks, armored personnel carriers, artillery and mortars. They also had an effective, though not state of the art, integrated air defense network. Their greatest capability was their police and para-

military forces in Kosovo. These forces prosecuted most of the killing and were most difficult to detect. Without a ground threat, they did not have to deploy their ground forces. This allowed them to hide their combat power and effectively use decoys.

Application of Power

The diplomatic and military (air strikes) instruments of power were the primary tools to achieve US and NATO objectives.⁴⁷ The US had three diplomatic objectives during the operation; “ensure NATO remained united and firm in order to prevail in the conflict,” “prevent the conflict from widening by helping the countries that were directly affected to cope with the humanitarian crisis,” and “to work constructively with Russia.”⁴⁸ The informational and economic instruments were used less effectively. The international community did levy some economic sanctions, travel restrictions, and froze some financial holdings, but they did not have a significant impact on Serbia. The information instrument was used less skillfully. The international media captured horrifying accounts of atrocities committed by the Serbs, and in some cases the KLA and the mass exodus of refugees prior to the campaign. However, during the campaign, there was no national or alliance coherent plan to counter President Milosevic’s ability to focus on Serbian civilian casualties inflicted by NATO bombing, despite continued war crimes and refugee problems in Kosovo.

KNOWLEDGE

Within the structure of NATO, allied forces had the capacity for information superiority at the strategic and operational level. The fact that NATO had been engaging with both Milosevic and the Serbian Military for ten years provided a wealth of information on their capabilities. Furthermore, Milosevic and his senior cabinet officials were no enigma to NATO, who had been dealing with them diplomatically for years. It was the lack of accurate and timely information at the tactical level that was lacking. This again was due primarily to the Rules of Engagement for the pilots, and the lack of ground force observation. This made target acquisition and battle damage assessment difficult at best.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

The NATO command structure was used throughout the operation. The basic chain of command ran from GEN Clark through Allied Forces South (AFSOUTH), US Navy ADM Ellis, to its air-component command COMAIRSOUTH, US Air Force LTG Short. What complicated the command and control were the parallel US and other NATO member command structures. Each of these three critical commanders was dual hatted with US parallel commands. Under USEUCOM, GEN Clark established a supporting command and control structure placing ADM

Ellis as the Commander JTF Noble Anvil (the US portion of Allied Force). He maintained command of the US Sixth Fleet commanded by VADM Murphy, 16th Air Force commanded by LTG Short, TF Hawk commanded by LTG Hendrix, and the Joint Psychological Operations Task Force (JPOTF) . A US Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) stayed under the control of CINC USEUCOM. The greatest source of friction within this structure was the responsiveness of the same commanders to NATO's governing North Atlantic Council (NAC) and the US command structure (FIGURE 3).




FIGURE 3 ALLIED FORCE COMMAND AND CONTROL JAN-JUN 99⁴⁹

The lack of US and coalition marine and ground forces simplified this potentially cumbersome structure. LTG Short exercised his planning and operations in the combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) under the 5th Allied Tactical Air Force in Vicenza, Italy. This command and control arrangement worked well. The greatest challenges were centered around Command, Control, Communications, and Computers (C4) interoperability with other NATO members.

OPERATIONS

With the lack of ground, naval surface, and marine coalition forces, there is little to be discussed with respect to RDO characteristic of dominant maneuver. Even the use of special operations ground forces to provide special reconnaissance, target identification, and terminal guidance for precision guided munitions, either unilaterally, or in support of the KLA would have

provided another dimension to the all air campaign. The same is true with information operations. Although the US military recognized the capabilities that information operations can bring to the fight, they were unable to effectively conduct them because of the lack of "advanced planning and necessary strategic guidance to define key objectives."⁵⁰ That leaves the analysis of operations to precision engagement and the use of air power under political constraints.

GEN Clark engineered the phased bombing campaign on two "axes", strategic attack against enabling targets in Serbia (favored by the Americans), and a tactical attack focusing on Serbian forces in Kosovo (favored by many European NATO allies).⁵¹ In planning phase 1 of the operation, LTG Short identified 1,000 targets aimed at air defense, command and control, and infrastructure targets in Belgrade designed to "go after the head of the snake" and "hit them where it hurts most".⁵² Essentially, he determined President Milosevic to be the strategic center of gravity and designed his campaign to attack it. He was astonished to find that the NAC only approved 91 targets, which were attacked within the first three days. They failed to influence Milosevic, and left NATO with no plan. During this operational pause while NATO agreed on more targets, Serbian forces began their Operation Horseshoe against the KLA, committing war crimes, mass murders, and causing a mass exodus of Kosovars.

With the occasional exception of an approved target in Yugoslavia, the bombing shifted primarily to Kosovo. Limited by the 15,000 foot control measure and no forward air controllers on the ground, pilots were asked to do the impossible task of attriting the Serbian Army in order to stop the ethnic violence in Kosovo. After the NATO summit meeting on 23 April, the air campaign once again began to focus on Belgrade, until the Chinese Embassy was attacked because of a mapping error. This accident put the political constraints back on target selection for the remainder of the campaign until President Milosevic capitulated after a diplomatic breakthrough with the Russian delegation who agreed to support the NATO demands.

Precision engagement munitions played a large role in the strategy to force Milosevic to the bargaining table, particularly in the phases of the campaign fought in downtown Belgrade. However, precision guided munitions do little good unless they hit the right target to produce the right effect which leads to the campaign objectives which should be tied to the center(s) of gravity. The political constraints on both target selection and on the pilots who dropped them stripped the Combined Force Air Component Commander (CFACC) from a campaign of effects-based operations. Although NATO carefully planned each target with the intent to limit collateral damage, the campaign resulted in 16 errant bombing incidents which killed an estimated 2,000 Kosovar and Serbian civilians.⁵³

It is difficult to determine exactly what caused Milosevic to surrender, but it is attributed to the combination of pressure created by five effects.⁵⁴

- The solidarity of the NATO Alliance.
- NATO's continued efforts to diplomatically engage with Russia.
- The NATO build-up of ground power in the region (primarily peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance forces) and the discussion of a ground option.
- The relative success of the KLA.
- Economic and political sanctions and indictment of Milosevic for war crimes.

CASE STUDY EVALUATION

If maintaining the consensus of NATO and the capitulation of Milosevic had been the stated political objectives, then Operations Allied Force would have been a more exalted success. But they were not. One of NATO's key interests, to thwart ethnic cleaning, and two of President Clinton's political objectives (deter the Serbs from attacking helpless Kosovar Albanians and damage Serbia's capacity to wage war against Kosovo by seriously diminishing its military capabilities) were not accomplished. In fact, the air-only campaign failed to stop accelerated brutality in Kosovo. In the year leading up to Operation Allied Force, there was an estimated 2,000 Kosovars killed, another 250,000 forced from their homes, and an estimated 384,000 refugees in neighboring countries.⁵⁵ By the end of May 99, 10 days before the war was to end, there were an estimated 5,000 Kosovars executed, 1.5 Million (90% of the Kosovo population) expelled from their homes, of which 580,000 were rendered homeless, an additional 422,000 refugees, and 225,000 Kosovar men believed to be missing.⁵⁶ Moreover, Serbia's military was left essentially intact, destroying an estimated 93 tanks, 153 APCs, 339 military vehicles, and 389 indirect fire pieces.⁵⁷

The operation was not rapid, taking 78 days when NATO planners believed it would take only three⁵⁸ and GEN Clark himself believed it could have been accomplished through non-military means.⁵⁹ Neither was it decisive, at the end of the hostilities after NATO forces dropped over 23,000 bombs (35% which were precision or near precision guided munitions), Milosevic was still in power, his military forces intact, and he understood the agreement to be for only one year.⁶⁰

With the signing of the NATO's Military Technical Agreement by all parties, the Serbs withdrew their forces. The following day, the United Nations adopted Resolution 1244 for peacekeeping operations in Kosovo. NATO had already begun forming a multi-national peace-keeping force for the anticipated Serbian withdrawal. Though compounded by massive

numbers of refugees, many homeless, Operation Allied Force transitioned in to Operation Joint Guardian. 50,000 soldiers from 28 nations have been on the ground there now for almost three years, including 7,000 Americans.

OBSERVATIONS

While the conduct of NATO's first combat operation provided some outstanding lesson's learned which, when implemented, can vastly improve its future warfighting capability, it serves as a great case study for the misapplication of power to achieve political objectives. Two fundamental factors are paramount. First, the lower the national interest, the less risk its political and military officials will be willing to take. In this operation, the willingness of every nation, and NATO as a whole, to place force protection above mission accomplishment only shifted the risk to those the operation was designed to protect. Second, the more political interests are emphasized over the accomplishment of a military mission, the less likely military commanders will be allowed to base their operation on fundamental military principles and joint or combined doctrine, such as RDO.

These two factors, which will most likely be present in future coalition and alliance operations, can have profound implications for the RDO Concept. The ability to share information among nations, with varying technological capabilities and potentially different relationships with the adversary, and be able to maintain operational security poses a tremendous challenge. Command and control presumes a US led alliance or coalition in order to integrate and leverage off of the other elements of national power. RDO requires the freedom of execution to attack the enemy's center of gravity, or specific critical nodes in the system of systems to achieve effects based operations with the appropriate force, not just politically acceptable force. "The post Cold War world is a world predominantly of low-technology within states, not high-tech combat between states."⁶¹ Kosovo serves as a telling example of this. With the reliance of RDO on technology as an enabler, it is critical not to think that technology in and of itself can win campaigns.

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

SUMMARY

Urgent Fury provides a good frame of reference for measuring improvement in conducting high-end small scale contingencies. At the strategic level, it was marked by incomplete coordination and exclusion of several interagency and Joint Staff components. This directly caused a lack of actionable intelligence to target the coherence of the enemy which resulted in

attrition based operations. It also demonstrates the deconfliction rather than integration of the diplomatic, informational, and economic instruments of national power, operating before and after, but not during the operation. At the operational and tactical level, it represented a lack of joint force interoperability for command and control and operations during both planning and execution.

Just Cause demonstrated how a coup de main, similar to the plan intended for Urgent Fury, was better executed because of superior intelligence, command and control, pre-positioned forces, and planning time. This resulted in the ability to conduct parallel and distributed attacks across the battle space to destroy the enemy's coherence. Effective command and control at the operational level was eased by an army-centric and unilateral force which required minimal service interoperability. It also lacked interagency coordination to assist in the transition to post-conflict stability operations.

Operation Allied Force demonstrated the risk produced when resources and strategic concepts are insufficient to meet objectives. In this case, it shifted the risk to non-combatants rather than the military force. Set in the context of a multi-national NATO alliance, it demonstrated how the attempt to use effects based operations was overcome by political interests and the adverse effect that coercive diplomacy can have on executing campaigns in accordance with military doctrine.

CONCLUSIONS

Does RDO represent a revolutionary approach that differs from the way the United States has executed other small scale contingencies in the past?

Technology has and will continue to force change in military doctrine by enabling new capabilities. But technology in and of itself does not necessarily result in revolutionary changes to military theory. There are three fundamental differences between RDO and past contingency operations.

First, acting with and leveraging other elements of national power to understand and reduce the adversary's critical capabilities and coherence. Improving the interagency process to harmonize national power is not new, but the belief that they can be integrated before, during, and after operations at the strategic, operational, and tactical level represents the belief in a new synergistic capability. Second, effects-based operations represent more than an attack on centers of gravity. It relies on a superior knowledge of the environment, friendly, and enemy capabilities to determine causal linkages in a system of systems.⁶² When these linkages are attacked by lethal or non-lethal means using any or all instruments of national power, success is

measured by the physical, functional, or psychological outcome on the enemy. Third, the recognition of the asymmetric potential of information operations to produce electronic, lethal, non-lethal, influence, cerebral, and decision-apparatus effects on the enemy.⁶³ The object of war is not to kill the enemy, but to break his will to resist.⁶⁴ Historically, this has been done by either attrition or destroying the enemy's cohesion, or a combination of both.⁶⁵ RDO focuses on destroying the enemy's cohesion.

Does RDO offer any value-added?

STRENGTHS OF RDO CONCEPT (VALUE-ADDED)

The greatest strength of RDO may be its parts, and not its sum. Both case studies exposed weaknesses that RDO initiatives can significantly improve. These will be discussed within the context of RDO's three main sub-components of Knowledge, Command and Control, and Operations.

Improving situational awareness of the environment, the enemy, and friendly forces has always been a goal to improve operations. Though it is doubtful that technology will assure the accuracy of that information, it can certainly increase its speed and availability. Most importantly it can share that information throughout the full spectrum of the command (strategic and interagency, theater, and JTF commander) and throughout the crisis (planning, execution, and transition). The specific procedures and systems to accomplish this are beneficial to the full spectrum of future joint operations.

RDO command and control proposes to use technology as well as procedures and organizational structure to ensure coherent joint command and control and networking critical decision making nodes at strategic, operational, and tactical level. The establishment of the Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) is an excellent example of this. Additionally, collaborative planning enabled by Joint Interactive Planning (JIP) can result in rapid decision cycles by flattening the command hierarchy and the speed of information flow between higher, lower, and adjacent commands.

The strength of RDO is derived more from its enablers than its sub-components of dominant maneuver, precision engagement, and information operations. The two most value added enablers are rapid force deployment and agile sustainment operations. The ability to deploy directly into theater with a smaller, more lethal and tailored force package would result in strategic maneuver.⁶⁶ This is the key to rapid and decisive operations. It also provides political leaders more flexibility to integrate military options into their theater strategy during crisis action planning.

WEAKNESSES OF RDO CONCEPT (DISCONNECTS)

The first weakness of RDO is that it is too narrowly defined, designed only for the “high-end” small scale contingencies. What if the political objectives require military action, but do not fit into the RDO niche? For example, the reason Just Cause was allowed to be prosecuted as a coup de main was because the political climate allowed it. Had the President decided that the political climate warranted a less direct course of action, he could have chosen to follow the original PRAYER BOOK OPLAN. This campaign would have included a slower force build-up and a phased approach to the application of military and other instruments of power.

Second, the hypothesis that RDO equals an ONA enabled SJC2E conducting effects-based operations is invalid. While it might work, it doesn’t necessarily have to work if all three elements are in place. ONA assumes timely and accurate information, but knowledge is subjective, relative, and potentially wrong or incomplete. As the saying goes, “you don’t know what you don’t know”.⁶⁷ The use of a SJC2E is irrelevant, a properly augmented Joint Task Force Headquarters can potentially achieve the same results and the SJC2E concept. Finally, political limitations can deny certain capabilities, battle space, or time needed to attack enemy capabilities, or preclude the approval to attack specific targets needed to achieve effects-based operations. Conversely, if the hypothesis is true, why is it limited to only “high-end” small scale contingencies and not full spectrum operations?

Third, diplomatic, informational, and economic instruments of power have historically been used to prevent armed conflict, not support it. If those measures fail, then military power is used. The concept of using all instruments of power to do both is unprecedented at the operational level. Furthermore, the belief that these other instruments of power can reduce force structure and length of time for the operation is potentially dangerous. Two things need to change in the interagency to make this possible: the nature (strategic-political focus) and culture (policy making strategic crisis action vice detailed planning). Getting the interagency to conform to joint military doctrine will be a significant challenge.

Fourth, while RDO realizes the need for the integration of multinational alliances or coalitions, it does not convincingly address how it will integrate them into RDO. For example, during Allied Force, differences in alliance capabilities resulted in a distinct “A Team and B Team.”⁶⁸ Those who effectively contribute and those who could not. The application of the concept of dominant maneuver “will leave coalitions behind, they will be along for the ride, with the exception of a few trusted agents.”⁶⁹ Since fighting with multi-national coalitions is a critical

part to how we will fight in the future, these issues need to be fully addressed before RDO can be value added.

Finally, how will RDO be able to operate an ONA and still maintain operational security in a global information age? Despite strict measures during Urgent Fury and Just Cause which precluded full interagency involvement, tactical surprise was still compromised. During Allied Force, OPSEC violations by a member of NATO resulted in advanced warning of attacks on targets in Yugoslavia.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The success of RDO as a concept should be less narrowly focused on "high-end" small scale contingency campaigns and more broadly focused on conducting operations within a campaign across the full spectrum of conflict. The overarching characteristics of US future joint operations (knowledge centric, effects based, coherently joint, and fully networked) serve as ample characteristics for conducting military operations across this full spectrum. The component parts to RDO, specifically Knowledge and Command and Control are already value added to the conduct of any military operation, not just high-end small scale contingencies. There is no need to "pigeon-hole" the RDO initiatives into a smaller spectrum of operations.

RDO operations must fully integrate dominant maneuver, precision engagement, and information operations. No one by itself will be as effective as the synergy of the three, and all three must be used based upon the analysis of what it takes to defeat the coherence of the enemy. Historically, paralytic effects of firepower erode over time and they must be exploited by decisive maneuver, particularly on the ground.⁷⁰ Effects-Based Operations cannot be confused with precision guided air power. Those are only enablers to achieve a portion of EBO. Hence, RDO may not reduce the amount of time or forces needed to capitulate the enemy. That depends upon analysis of what it takes to defeat the enemy's coherence.

RDO must be successful in transforming and integrating each service component of the entire joint force, not independent forces capable of conducting RDO on its own. The Army's Objective Force (AOF), the Air Force's Expeditionary Air Force (EAF), the Navy's Network Centric Operations, and the Marine Corps' Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare (EMW) all provide transformation initiatives to achieve JV 2020. But for instance, how do the Navy and Air Force visions provide the inter-service capability for strategic mobility to the ground forces needed to achieve RDO? RDO initiatives must capture the less lucrative "enablers" such as increased airlift, fast sea-lift, installations as a power projection platform, and intelligence and logistics reach-back capabilities for RDO to be successful.

USJFCOM's Whitepaper for Improving US Interagency Operational Planning and Coordination proposes some excellent initiatives for interagency integration into military operations.⁷¹ However, revolutionary changes in this process will require a change of the culture, nature, and mission of the interagency. It took congressional reform in the form of the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act to transform joint operations in the Department of Defense. RDO experimentation must identify its own recommended reforms, leverage off of expected changes required for homeland defense initiatives, and sponsor congressionally mandated reforms that address training, career assignment paths, and procedures for long term change in the interagency process.

RDO serves as a useful concept for experimentation. The concept as proposed in the RDO Whitepaper may not be the panacea for joint operations as the sum of its parts. Rather, the parts of the sum of RDO may prove to be the most value added vehicle for joint transformation to achieve JV 2020.

Word Count 9,073

ENDNOTES

¹ David Jablonsky, "US Military Doctrine and The Revolution in Military Affairs," Parameters 24 (Autumn 1994): 19. In 1993, the Center for Strategic and International Studies defined the revolution as "a fundamental advance in technology, doctrine or organization that renders existing methods of conducting warfare obsolete."

² Donald H. Rumsfeld, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington, D.C.: The Pentagon, September 2001), 6.

³ Henry H. Shelton, Joint Vision 2020 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, June 2000), 3. The capstone strategic concept of Joint Vision 2020 consists of "full spectrum dominance-achieved through the interdependent application of dominant maneuver, precision engagement, focused logistics, and full dimensional protection" enabled by information superiority.

⁴ Henry H. Shelton, "Fletcher Conference 2000," lecture, Arlington, VA, 16 November 2000, available from <<http://www.dtic.mil/jcs/chairman/CJCS-Fletcher.html>>, 24 October 2001.

⁵ Richard Szafranski, "Thinking About Small Wars," Parameters 20 (September 1990): 39.

⁶ U.S. Joint Forces Command, A Concept for Rapid Decisive Operations—Final Draft (Norfolk, VA: J9 Futures Lab, 25 October 2001), 8. This draft is also known as RDO Whitepaper Version 2.0.

⁷ Ibid., 12. Rapid is defined as, "Accomplishing the objective of the campaign with speed and timing that is superior, absolutely and relatively, to the speed of the adversary."

⁸ Ibid. Decisive is defined as, "Imposing our will on the enemy by breaking his coherence and defeating his will and ability to fight."

⁹ Ibid., 17.

¹⁰ Ibid., iii.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Ibid., iv.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Ibid., v.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Ibid., 13-14. These three major components of RDO are covered in depth throughout the RDO Whitepaper. This brief synopsis helps the reader understand these fundamental concepts: Knowledge is based upon creating and sharing superior information in order to focus combat power to produce a desired effect. It is achieved by the three following sub-

components. *Operational Net Assessment (ONA)* is a process which draws information from the tactical, operational, strategic, and interagency levels to provide the Joint Force Commander (JFC) visibility of friendly actions as well as the potential enemy's elements of national power. The *Common Relevant Operating Picture (CROP)* is a virtual warehouse of information which can be tailored to meet the needs of the JFC. *Joint Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (JSR)* is a network approach to managing ISR assets and feeding its information into the CROP to support timely information needs to conduct effects-based operations. *Command and Control* provides a greater coherence of planning and execution for the JFC while also including interagency and multinational collaboration. The first sub-component, *Adaptive Joint C2*, centers around a *Standing Joint Task Force Command and Control Element (SJC2E)* which is embedded in the staff of each Regional Unified Commander to provide continuity of information and transition to crisis response and combat operations. The *Joint Interactive Planning (JIP)* sub-component replaces the current sequential planning model with a parallel and collaborative approach ranging from strategic to tactical headquarters. The third, *Interagency Operations (IA)* enable the JFC to integrate diplomatic, informational, military, and economic (DIME) strategic objectives into theater actions. Finally, *Multinational Operations* leverages off of peacetime security cooperation plans and includes possible inclusion of coalition forces into the ONA. *Operations* are the application of military power in conjunction with other elements of national power and enabled by superior knowledge will allow both linear/contiguous as well as non-linear/non-contiguous operations to attack an adversary's centers of gravity and critical vulnerabilities. The integrated application of the sub-components of *Dominant Maneuver*, *Precision Engagement*, and *Information Operations* enable the JFC to mass effects without massing forces at an accelerated battle tempo. *Operational Enablers* are concepts and processes to achieve Assured Access (necessary battle space to introduce the joint force into theater), *Rapid Force Deployment* both strategic deployment and operational movement, *Agile Sustainment Operations* (direct distribution of mission configured loads), and *Full Dimensional Protection* resulting from superior knowledge and dissemination of threat information.

¹⁷ Kevin M. Woods, "Rapid Decisive Operations," briefing slides, Norfolk, RDO Concept Team, USJFCOM J9, 2 November 2001.

¹⁸ RDO Whitepaper., vi. Unified Vision 01(UV-01), which was conducted in June 2001, developed doctrine and organization for command and control of RDO in this decade. Millennium Challenge 02 (MC-02), scheduled in the Summer of 2002 is designed to assess the extent RDO can be achieved this decade (through 2010). Building off of the results of MC-02, Olympic Challenge 04 (OC-04) will assess the highest payoff initiatives for the next decade (2011-2020). These experiments are discussed in more detail in Chapter 5 of the RDO Whitepaper.

¹⁹ Marcia Vivancos, Charles C. Stuart, and Will Lyman, auth., *War and Peace in Panama*, 58 min., PBS Video, 1991, videocassette.

²⁰ Ronald H. Cole, *Operation Just Cause: The Planning and Execution of Joint Operations in Panama, February 1988-January 1990* (Washington, D.C.: Joint History Office, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1995), 6.

²¹ The establishment of an American owned trans-isthmus railroad in 1855, the American Canal Zone in 1903, and the completion of the Panama Canal in 1914 mark the beginning of

deep national interests in Panama. The sovereignty of the Panama Canal Zone and stark differences in conditions with the rest of Panama had always been a point of contention with the Panamanian government. Tensions from this produced riots in 1964. Ultimately, the 1977 Panama Canal Treaty was signed by Panamanian President Omar Torrijos and President Jimmy Carter to reduce this tension.

²² Ibid., 43.

²³ Ibid., 35.

²⁴ Ibid., 29.

²⁵ Federation of American Scientists (FAS), "Operation Just Cause," available from <http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/ops/just_cause.htm>; Internet; accessed 10 December 2001.

²⁶ Cole., 37.

²⁷ Ibid., 34.

²⁸ Gerald Hopple and Cynthia Gilley, "Policy without Intelligence," in American Intervention in Grenada: The Implications of Operation "Urgent Fury", ed. Peter M. Dunn and Bruce W. Watson (Boulder, Westview Press, 1985), 55.

²⁹ Thomas Donnelly, Margaret Roth, and Caleb Baker, Operation Just Cause: The Storming of Panama (New York: Lexington Books, 1991), 55.

³⁰ James T. Jackson, Just Cause: Some Lessons Learned, Individual Study Project (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 2 April 1991), 86.

³¹ Donnelly, 374.

³² Donnelly, 376.

³³ Eytan Gilboa, "The Panama Invasion Revisited: Lessons learned from the Use of Force in the Post-Cold War Era," Political Science Quarterly 110 (Winter 1995-96): 540. Failed attempts to remove Noriega actually strengthened his position, making it more important to remove him from power.

³⁴ Cole, 65. U.S. casualties sustained were 23 soldiers killed and 322 wounded. Panamanian casualties, to include, to include civilians, were 297 killed, 123 wounded, and 468 detained, with the capture of 36 armored vehicles, 7 boats, 33 aircraft, and 77,553 weapons.

³⁵ United Nations, "UN Resolution 1199," 23 September 1998; available from <<http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1998/sres1199.htm>>; Internet; accessed 16 March 2002.

³⁶ Ronald Scott Mangum, "NATO's Attack on Serbia: Anomaly or Emerging Doctrine?" Parameters 30 (Winter 2000-01): 42. UN Resolutions 1160, 1199, and 1203 neither mentioned armed intervention or NATO.

³⁷ Wesley K. Clark and Peter J. Boyer, auth., War in Europe, 120 min., PBS Video, 1999, videocassette.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ William S. Cohen and Henry H. Shelton, "Joint Statement on the Kosovo After Action Review," 14 October 1999; available from <http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Oct1999/b10141999_bt478-99.html>; Internet; accessed 18 February 2002.

⁴⁰ Federation of American Scientists (FAS), "Operation Allied Force/Operation Noble Anvil," available from <http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/ops/allied_force.htm>; Internet; accessed 10 December 2001.

⁴¹ United Nations, "UN Resolution 1203," 24 October 1998; available from <<http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1998/sres1203.htm>>; Internet; accessed 16 March 2002.

⁴² Cohen, Joint Statement on the Kosovo After Action Review.

⁴³ President Bill Clinton, "24 March 1999 Statement of Objectives; quoted in "Verbatim," Air Force Magazine, (August 1999): 106.

⁴⁴ Federation of American Scientists (FAS), "Operation Allied Force/Operation Noble Anvil."

⁴⁵ Jim Garamone, "Cohen, Shelton Answer Allied Force Questions," American Forces Press Service, 23 July 1999; available from <http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul1999/n07231999_9907231.html>; Internet; accessed 18 February 2002.

⁴⁶ John A. Tirpak, "Short's View of the Air Campaign," Air Force Magazine September 1999, 45. LTG Short instituted this force protection measure because he determined that the targeting Serbian forces in Kosovo was a misuse of air power and not worth the risk to his pilots. He clearly advocated attacking strategic targets in Belgrade.

⁴⁷ William S. Cohen, and Henry H. Shelton, Kosovo/Operation Allied Force After-Action Report, Report to Congress, (Washington, D.C.: The Pentagon, 31 January 2000), 15.

⁴⁸ Ibid., 9.

⁴⁹ Ibid., 20.

⁵⁰ Ibid., 99.

⁵¹ Wesley K. Clark, Waging Modern War (New York: Public Affairs, 2001), 271.

⁵² Clark, War in Europe. Interview with LTG Short.

⁵³ Federation of American Scientists (FAS), "Operation Allied Force/Operation Noble Anvil."

⁵⁴ Cohen, Kosovo/Operation Allied Force After-Action Report, 11.

⁵⁵ NATO Historical Overview, "NATO's Role in Relation to the Conflict in Kosovo," 15 July 99; available from <<http://www.nato.int/kosovo/history.htm>>; Internet; accessed 17 March 2002.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ Cohen, Kosovo/Operation Allied Force After-Action Report, 86.

⁵⁸ Clark, War in Europe, comment made by LTG Short.

⁵⁹ Timothy L. Thomas, "Kosovo and the Current Myth of Information Superiority," Parameters 30 (Spring 2000): 14. During a Senate Armed Services Committee session, GEN Clark questioned the need for an air campaign against Serbia. He believed NATO could have used a combination of legal means to block the Danube and Adriatic Ports and other non-lethal information operations.

⁶⁰ Clark, War in Europe, comment made by narrator.

⁶¹ Jeffrey Record, "Operation Allied Force: Yet Another Wake-up Call for the Army?" Parameters 29 (Winter 1999-2000): 20.

⁶² RDO Whitepaper., 9.

⁶³ RDO Whitepaper., 38.

⁶⁴ Robert H. Scales, "Cycles of War," Armed Forces Journal International, July 1997, 40.

⁶⁵ Huba Wass de Czege and Antulio Echevarria, "Landpower and Future Strategy: Insights from the Army After Next," Joint Force Quarterly, Spring 1999, 68.

⁶⁶ Vincent J. Goulding, "From Chancellorsville to Kosovo, Forgetting the Art of War," Parameters 30 (Summer 2000): 8.

⁶⁷ Anonymous

⁶⁸ Tirpak, 47.

⁶⁹ The ideas in this statement are based on remarks made by a speaker participating in the Noon-Time Lecture series at the U.S. Army War College. The topic of the lecture was Dominant Maneuver.

⁷⁰ Scales, 40.

⁷¹ U.S. Joint Forces Command, A Concept for Improving U.S. Interagency Operational Planning and Coordination (Norfolk, VA: J9 Futures Lab, January 2001), 8. This draft is also known as IA Whitepaper Version 1.0.

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